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Abstract
Job search is a spatially oriented activity. Searching farther is costly, and working far
away from home entails high costs, affecting job acceptance decisions. We build a simple
theoretical framework where job seekers choose how much to search, how far to search, and
what lowest wage they accept for a given commute distance. In this setup, unemployment
insurance discourages broader job search through reducing the net gain from getting a job.
Opposite forces encourage broader search, either through the re-entitlement effect or, under
liquidity constraints, to finance costly spatial job search.
We use a unique dataset on all workers entering unemployment in Austria between 1995
to 2004 to investigate these forces. We find that newly unemployed workers initially find
relatively more frequentely jobs in the same workplace as they used to be employed. As the
unemployment spell gets longer, they both accept lower wages and progressively enlarge their
radius of search, ending up with a job farther away from their previous workplace (but not
necessarily farther away from their residence). Unemployment insurance reduces reservation
wages at a given accepted commute distance, and encourages search outside the municipality
of the previous job. Reducing potential benefit duration affects wages and commuting distance
more strongly than changes in the benefit level.
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1 Introduction
Most people do not work where they live, and travel times to work are substantial. Com-
muters travel about 70 minutes to and from work in the US, and about 60 minutes in
Germany, the UK, and France (OECD (2010)). Standard models of job search do not ac-
count for the fact that job seekers work outside their homes. Neglecting space is, perhaps,
a useful simplification. But space has to matter in some decisions. The decision to accept a
job will depend on commuting costs and mobility costs, not only the wage and its distribu-
tion. Job seekers who are looking for jobs will, optimally, want to use a reservation strategy
involving both a reservation wage and a reservation commute distance, tied to each other.
Further, even within acceptable commute distances, searching for jobs far away from one’s
residence may be expensive. Under liquidity constraints, job search efficiency may be seri-
ously limited. This implies that unemployment insurance plays a role typically overlooked
to improve the job search process.
The distance dimension of job search has several policy implications, beyond equilibrium
unemployment, notably on the optimal design of unemployment compensation. Although
explicit in many empirical and theoretical works, it is not central in most analyses. As a
matter of fact, the commute time dimension is relevant in job acceptance decisions, and its
impact is of the order of magnitude of the wage dimension; to illustrate, Table 1 shows that
many job seekers report that the primary reason for rejecting a job offer is not for too low
wages, but for too high distance. Excluding all reasons but wages and commute distance,
the last column shows that 60% of job offers are rejected for too low wages, but 40% are
rejected for too high commute distances. The commute distance is therefore a potentially
first-order margin in job acceptance decisions. Of course, wage and distances interact: there
might be a wage level making a commute distance acceptable.
In this paper, we explore these trade-offs and proceed as follows. We first derive a
simple theory of job search in space that includes commute distance and optimal spatial
search strategies. This will introduce the key concepts and discipline the empirical analysis
in providing simple expressions for hazard rates. The three main endogenous variables are:
the wage reservation strategy for a given commute distance (or equivalently the optimal
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Table 1: Reasons for rejecting offers
%
% excl.
last 3
% excl.
last 3 & hrs
% compared
to wage rate
1. rate of pay 12.1 21.8 24.7 59.7
2. temporary/insecure job 6.65 12.0 13.6 -
3. type of work 12.9 23.3 26.4 -
4. number of working hours 6.05 11.0 - -
5. working time (day/night time, shifts...) 6.42 11.6 12.4 -
6. working conditions / environment 3.06 5.54 6.27 -
7. distance to job / commuting 8.14 14.7 16.7 40.3
8. could not start the job at required time 4.82 - - -
9. other reasons for not accepting 20.99 - - -
10. not yet decided 18.93 - - -
Sum 100 100 100 100
Source: Rupert et al. (2009).
reservation distance for a given wage); the optimal radius of job search in space; and within
this range, the optimal intensity of search effort. We solve for the optimal acceptance
decision where the interplay of accepted wages and accepted commute distance depends on
the marginal rate of substitution between the two: individuals can buy short commutes
with a lower wage or seek to be compensated with a higher wage for long commutes. This
has obvious implications on job search strategies: indeed, once they correctly anticipate
their future decision rules, unemployed individuals looking for a job may try to enter jobs
that pay a higher wage and involve a shorter commute time relative to the previous job.
We explore the implications for hazard rates and the role of unemployment insurance under
various assumptions on liquidity constraints. As a matter of fact, in several countries, the
spatial component of the costs of job search is either partly financed by the employment
agencies, or deductible from income taxes1.
1Eg. in the US, job search expenses are partly deductible from IRS. “To qualify for a deduction, your
expenses must be spent on a job search in your current occupation. You may not deduct expenses you incur
while looking for a job in a new occupation; (...) ; If you travel to look for a new job in your present
occupation, you may be able to deduct travel expenses to and from the area to which you travelled. You can
only deduct the travel expenses if the trip is primarily to look for a new job ; (...) ; You cannot deduct job
search expenses if you are looking for a job for the first time.” Source ; http://www.irs.gov/uac/Job-Search-
Expenses-Can-be-Tax-Deductible. In France, a similar regime of tax deduction applies, complemented
with direct subsidies of job search from Poˆle Emploi (the employment agency): http://vosdroits.service-
public.fr/particuliers/F1640.xhtml. In Austria, job search assistance covers parts of job search costs.
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We use an exhaustive panel of newly unemployed workers based on an administrative
dataset in Austria, covering years 1995 to 2004 and overall more than 150 000 spells of
unemployment to establish a few stylized facts related to commute distance and job accep-
tance decisions. The choice of Austria is motivated by data availability: we know the city
of residence and the city of employment and can match these informations with information
about transportation time from a private company which provided a matrix of travel time
based on the existing network of roads and highways in 2000, approximately in the middle
of our sample. The choice of Austria is also relevant because we want to isolate the com-
mute time decision from the residential mobility decision. For unemployed individuals, we
calculate that about 6% change their residency over the turn of non-employment. It turns
out that the influence of mobility on the empirical results can be negligted in a first order,
which considerably simplifies the analysis
In the data,we observe fairly high dispersion in the change of commuting distance and
wage which make both margins relevant for unemployed individuals. We introduce an
analysis of a competing risks model and its relative hazard ratios. Newly unemployed
workers seem to start the job search from the same workplace as they used to be employed
and looking for high wage jobs. As the unemployment spell gets longer, they tend to
accept lower wages and progressively enlarge their range of search, ending up with a job
farther away from their previous workplace. We offer evidence of a reservation frontier
strategy in the wage/distance plane. We then investigate the role of policy and in particular
unemployment insurance, in estimating Cox Proportional Hazard models. They provide
measures of the causal effects of the unemployment insurance replacement rate, the social
assistance replacement rate, and benefit duration (proxied by potential benefit duration)
and show that their impact varies by destination (distance winners vs. loosers, wage loosers
vs. wage winners).
The empirical analysis thus offers guidance in the solution and the calibration of an en-
riched model of the labor market capturing in a more accurate the regularities in the data.
The model is therefore enriched along several dimensions. First, we allow for different unem-
ployment compensation regimes: newly unemployed workers are covered by unemployment
insurance, but they can subsequently loose it for a reduced level of benefits, in the unem-
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ployment assistance regime. We also allow individuals to target their job search activity
in space, distinguishing effort inside and outside the previous workplace. Finally, we also
introduce non-separability in consumption and search costs to allow for richer reservation
strategies. Once calibrated, the model reproduces the empirical fact that, over time and
as unemployment benefits decrease, the unemployed progressively adjust their reservation
strategies: their reservation wage goes down and in addition they start prospecting in dif-
ferent areas. The model predicts that individuals remaining unemployed for longer time
have a higher probability to enter less paying jobs and/or jobs located farther away from
the previous job. The model delivers simple expression for all hazard rates (overall exit
to employment, exits towards higher wages than in the previous job, exits towards lower
wages, exit towards higher commute distances and towards lower distances) and all relative
hazard rates.
A very large number of classical or more recent papers have been explicit about commute
distance. Crampton (1999) has a discussion of the optimal location of vacancies and their
number, illustrated by the classical papers by Seater (1979), Chirinko (1982) and more re-
cently van Ommeren et al. (1997). Racial differences have been analysed through the lens of
distance and access to jobs in the spatial mismatch literature following Kain (1968): papers
include Holzer (1986; 1987; 1988), Ihlanfeldt (1997), Zax and Kain (1996), Brueckner and
Zenou (2003) and Coulson et al. (2001) and are summarized in Gobillon et al. (2007) and
Zenou (2009); see also van Vuuren (mimeo) and Nenov (2015). The articulation between
commuting decisions and mobility decisions has been studied by Rupert and Wasmer (2012)
and applied to ethnic unemployment gaps in Gobillon et al. (2014) for commuting vs mo-
bility decisions. More closely related to our work, the role of local labor markets has been
investigated in Cheshire (1979), Rogerson (1982), Manning and Petrongolo (2011), Gobil-
lon et al. (2011) and Marinescu and Rathelot (mimeo). The latter find in particular that
job seekers’s applications from a particular website, Carreer.Builder, decrease by 20% every
5 kilometers of distance between the applicant’s address and the vacancy. Manning and
Petrongolo (2011) also found a large decay, somewhat higher (approximately 80%), but for
a different concept, the concept of job acceptance (and not of simple applications). Finally
our work is connected to the large literature measuring the value of time across different
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transportation modes, at short and longer distances (see Brownstone and Small (2005) for
road use and Hammadou and Jayet (2003) for longer transportation times). Recent papers,
using experimental setups, have investigated the role of information on search strategies,
including the broadness of search. See notably Altmann et al. (2015) and Belot et al. (2015).
Our paper also ties to a literature on the role of unemployment insurance for job finding
and job quality. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) were the first to look at the effect of unem-
ployment insurance on post-unemployment outcomes and find positive effects of unemploy-
ment benefits on post unemployment wages for different age groups and gender. Addison
and Blackburn (2000) provide evidence for a weakly positive effect of unemployment benefits
on post unemployment wages. Centeno and Novo (2006) use a quantile regression approach
to analyze the relationship between the unemployment insurance system and the quality
of subsequent wages and tenure over the whole support of the wage and tenure distribu-
tions. They find a positive impact of unemployment benefits on each quantile of the wage
and tenure distribution. Several recent studies, based on regression discontinuity designs,
find little or no effects of Potential Benefit Duration (PBD), mostly looking at wage or job
stability. Card et al. (2007a) and Lalive (2007) find little evidence on wages and/or job
stability in the Austrian context. van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) find that a reduction in
the potential benefit duration has only small effects on wages, on the duration of subsequent
employment and on the probability of securing a permanent rather than a temporary job.
Le Barbanchon (2012) finds no effects on wages or employment. Two studies find posi-
tive effects of PBD on low wage earners or job seekers at risk of exhausting their benefits.
Centeno and Novo (2009) detect a positive impact on the match quality for individuals at
the bottom of the wage distribution. Caliendo et al. (2013) find that the unemployed who
obtain a new job close to benefit exhaustion are more likely to leave subsequent employ-
ment and receive lower wages than than their counterparts with extended benefit duration.
Two studies on Germany find negative effects of PBD extensions. Schmieder et al. (2012)
analyze the long-term effects of extensions in UI durations taking into account not only the
initial, but also all recurrent nonemployment spells. They find significant long-run effects
of an extension in UI duration on the duration of nonemployment up to three years after
the start of the initial spell. Schmieder et al. (2013) study the effects of PBD changes on
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re-employment wages in Germany finding sharp negative effects of PBD extensions for older
workers. Two studies on the Austrian context find positive effects of benefit extensions.
Degen (2014) and Nekoei and Weber (2014) study the effects of PBD for job quality in
Austria, exploiting a sharp increase in PBD from 30 to 39 weeks for workers aged 40 years
or older. Both papers find a positive effect of prolonged PBD on wages on the order of 0.5
percentage points. Nekoei and Weber (2014) rationalize this finding in a directed job search
framework and discuss the implications of this finding for policy.
Our paper extends and complements this rich literature in several respects. We build
a simple theoretical search model where spatial decisions matter and make job acceptance
depend on both wages and commute distance. Although several papers have done similar
exercises, the model is flexible enough to provide functional forms that accurately match
empirical concepts, such as hazards, sub-hazards and relative hazards ratios with respect
to both commute distance and wage changes across jobs. We discuss whether and how
much job seekers trade these two dimensions off. We use a rich framework and study how
liquity constraints may impede job search and how a subsidy might improve efficiency. The
empirical exercise adds to the unterstanding of how unemployment benefits impact post-
unemployment outcomes. This paper adds to this literature in assessing systematically not
only how wages but also commuting distance is affected by the unemployment insurance
system by estimating the effects on both outcomes simulatenously. This sheds light on how
individuals not only decide for wages or distance but also for wages and distance. The
estimation by means of the competing risk approach together with non-linearities in the
determination of unemployment insurance parameters allows for a credible estimation of
the impact of these parameters on both, distance and wages. Overall, policy plays a crucial
but complex role on job acceptance decisions and in turn on job search processes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the key concepts behind the
spatial analysis of job search. Section 3 provides various and hopefully exhaustive evidence
of the role of space in job search and the spatial dispersion of commute distances, based on
our rich data set of unemployment spells in Austria. In Section 4, we extend the model
in order to provide a realistic calibration. In Section 5 we calibrate the model based on
relative hazard ratios in the data and draw lessons for policy. Section 6 concludes.
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2 A simple theory of search in space
The goal of this section is to provide the basic trade-offs of spatial search and comute and
draw some implications of the theory. The model derives the reservation strategy defined
here as the minimum acceptable wage for a given commute distance. Commute distance im-
plies some costs and effort. Reciprocally, there is a maximum acceptable commute distance
at a given wage. The agents, knowing their future strategy of job acceptance, optimally
calculate the range of search, that is the maximum distance within which to prospect; fi-
nally, they determine the optimal intensity of search effort, captured by the arrival rate of
job offers within the range of search.
2.1 Setup
2.1.1 Notations
Time is continuous. Individuals and firms discount the future at rate r. The level of benefits
is b. Searching for a job is more costly in more remote area. Let D be the radius of
search, and 2piλ be the rate of arrival of search offers (where 2pi is a simple proportionality
factor coming from the integration of search in a circle around the individuals’ location).
Job seekers control both the intensity of search effort λ and the range of search at a cost
C(D,λ). At this stage we do not specify the nature of the search costs but they may be both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary. We also assume perfect separability between search costs and
consumption. Denote by U(D,λ) the value of job search and by W (w, ρ) the value of being
employed at a wage w and at a commute distance ρ. The employed workers pay a commute
cost c(τρ) which depends on commute time ρ and the cost of transportation τ . We also
assume perfect separability in consumption and commute costs.
2.1.2 Unemployment and Employment values
Each job offer consists in a random draw of wage and distance from a given two-dimensional
distribution. We do not restrict the draws (w, ρ) to be independent. With notations Fρ(w)
and G(ρ) for the associated cumulated distributions of each variable separately, we can go
one step furher. In this case, the Bellman equations for job search are:
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rU(D,λ) = b− C(D,λ) + 2piλ
ˆ D
0
(ˆ
w
Max[W (w, ρ)− U ; 0]dFρ(w)
)
dG(ρ) (1)
The value function for employment is:
rW (w, ρ) = w − c(τρ) + s(U −W (w, ρ)) (2)
2.2 Interior solutions and strategies
The surplus from employment can be easily calculated, given the linearity in income. Notic-
ing that ∂W
∂w
(w, ρ) = 1
r+s
; and denoting by R(ρ) the reservation wage associated with distance
ρ, defined as W (R(ρ), ρ) = U(D∗, λ∗) = U∗ , we can rewrite the value of employment as a
linear function of w:
W (w, ρ)− U∗ = w −R(ρ)
r + s
= S(w, ρ) (3)
where the notation S(w, ρ) is the surplus value of holding a job paid w at a commute
distance ρ.
We can now derive the reservation wage: it turns out to depend on commute costs and
on the equity value of being unemployed under the optimal job search strategy. We have:
Lemma 1. The reservation wage is linearly increasing in commute costs and in the unem-
ployment value:
R(ρ) = c(τρ) + rU∗
It is convex or concave in the commute distance, depending on the convexity or concavity of
commute costs. Convexity would result from disutility from time spent in commute, while
concavity may result from optimization of transportation modes.
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The interior optimal search strategies also follow immediately.Let wmax be the upper
support of the wage distribution. Then, combining eq. 1 and 3 we have
rU(D,λ) = b− C(D,λ) + 2piλ
ˆ D
0
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ) (4)
The first order condition on the radius is obtained by deriving eq. 4:
C ′D(D
∗, λ∗) = 2piλ
(ˆ wmax
R(D∗)
S(w,D∗)fρ(w)dw
)
g(D∗) (5)
= 2piλg(D∗)EwS(w,D∗)
so that U(D,λ) is maximised with respect to the search strategy D when the marginal cost
of searching at one more unit of distance is equal to the marginal gain. The marginal gain
depends first on the direct impact on the flow of offers (first term of the right handside)
and second on the change of the surplus among acceptable offers (second term of the right
handside). The first order condition on optimal search effort affecting the arrival rate of
offers λ reads as follows:
C ′λ(D
∗, λ∗) = 2pi
ˆ D
0
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ) (6)
= 2piEw,ρS(w, ρ)
Both expressions show that the marginal cost has to equal the marginal gain of search,
either with respect to extending the range of search by one marginal unit D, or by increasing
the intensity of effort within the range. In both expressions, the marginal return on search
involves the expected surplus value of holding a job.
Lemma 2. Under separability of the cost function C(D,λ), equation (5) implies that a
higher arrival rate of offers λ is associated with a higher return on the range of search D,
implying a complementarity of the two dimensions of search.
Lemma 2 is not general, and under complementarity in the cost function C(D,λ), the two
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search variables may be more substitute to each other: a higher λ raising the marginal cost
of enlarging the range of search may in turn reduce the optimal radius D∗. The dominance
of each mechanism is an empirical matter and we leave the question unanswered here.
2.3 Hazard rates, odds ratios and rejection rate
The unemployment exit hazard is shaped by search intensity, search radius, and reservation
wage as follows:
haz = 2piλ
[ˆ D
0
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
]
The unemployment exit hazard depends on search intensity λ, search radius D, and on
the reservation wage R(ρ). Job seekers who search hard, or have a large search radius,
or have a low reservation wage, will leave unemployment for a regular job faster. The
unemployment exit hazard contains information on all three endogenous variables.
To anticipate the empirical part, we will decompose the total exit hazard into sub-
hazard rates that reflect the quality of jobs the unemployed might find: paying better or
worse, or being farther or closer to home than the previous job, like in a competing-risks
framework. More precisely, w−1 is the wage, and d−1 is the commuting distance in the job
prior to entering unemployment. w+ refers to a wage increase, d+ means an increase in
commute distance relative to the previous job. Equivalently, w− refers to a wage decrease,
d− means a decrease in commute distance relative to the previous job. The sub-hazard
rate haz(w+, d+), refers to job seekers accepting a new job with wage increase (w > w−1) at
the cost of commuting longer to this new job (ρ >d−1). The sub-hazard of finding a better
paying job located closer to home is defined as haz(w+, d−), the sub-hazard of finding a
worse paying job, located farther away from home is defined as haz(w−, d+), and the sub-
hazard rate of finding a worse paying job located closer to home is defined as haz(w−, d−).
We now express these sub-hazards in terms of the primitives of the model. Under the
assumption that determinants of job search have not varied since the previous episode of
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job search, the search radius includes the previous distance, and the reservation wage is
below the wage earned in the previous job : job seekers would accept the previous job if
offered again to them. The four sub-hazard rates are then easy to write as:
sub− haz(w+, d+) = 2piλ
ˆ D
d−1
ˆ wmax
w−1
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) = 2piλ[1− F (w−1)][G(D)−G(d−1)]
sub− haz(w+, d−) = 2piλ
ˆ d−1
0
ˆ wmax
w−1
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) = 2piλ[1− F (w−1)]G(d−1)
sub− haz(w−, d+) = 2piλ
ˆ D
d−1
ˆ w−1
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) = 2piλ
ˆ D
d−1
[Fρ(w−1)− F (R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
sub− haz(w−, d−) = 2piλ
ˆ d−1
0
ˆ w−1
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) = 2piλ
ˆ d−1
0
[Fρ(w−1)− Fρ(R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
As visible from the second equation, the first sub-hazard sub−haz(w+, d−) does not depend
on the endogenous variable D and on function R, which itself depends on the value of unem-
ployment U ; while the first one, sub− haz(w+, d+), depends only on search radius, D, but
not on the researvation wage. The last one, sub− haz(w−, d−), depends on the reservation
wage, R(ρ), but not on the search radius. Finally, the third one, sub−haz(w−, d+), depends
on both search radius, and reservation wage. All sub-hazards depend on search intensity
to the same extent, a result of our assumption that job seekers can not engage in directed
search.
Under the simplifying assumption that F is not indexed by ρ in the expressions above,
that is when the two distributions F and G are independent of each other, the relative
hazards – the odds ratios – with respect to sub − haz(w+, d−) can therefore be calculated
as follows:
relhaz =
sub− haz(w+, d+)
sub− haz(w+, d−) =
[G(D)−G(d−1)]
G(d−1)
relhaz2 =
sub− haz(w−, d+)
sub− haz(w+, d−) =
´ D
d−1
[F (w−1)− F (R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
[1− F (w−1)]G(d−1)
relhaz3 =
sub− haz(w−, d−)
sub− haz(w+, d−) =
´ d−1
0
[F (w−1)− F (R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
[1− F (w−1)]G(d−1)
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The first ratio of sub-hazards, relhaz, compares the chances of finding a better paying
job farther away from home with the chances of finding a better paying job closer to home.
This ratio should in principle depend on both the wage and distance in the previous job,
but wage terms actually cancel each other out and the ratio only depends on the previous
distance and the search radius. The last ratio relhaz3 represents the relative probability of
accepting a job with a wage cut compared to a better paying job, where both jobs are closer
to home than the previous job. This odds ratio provides information on the reservation
wage only, as both jobs are within the search radius. The ratio relhaz2 represents the
relative probability of accepting a job with a wage cut farther away from home relative to a
better paying jobs closer to home. Since the “bad” jobs in the numerator are worse in both
dimensions, the ratio relhaz2 reflects the joint evolution of reservation wages and search
radius. Odds ratios do not contain search intensity since it affects all sub-hazards to the
same extent.
The job rejection rate is, in the general case:
reject =
ˆ D
0
Fρ(R(ρ))dG(ρ)
Under the assumption of independence of the joint distribution of wages and distance, the
rejection rate increases in D: at a higher distance, it is more likely that the drawn wage
will not compensate for distance.
2.4 The effect of distance on wages
The model thus explicitly accounts for the role of distance on reservation wage and on
expected, accepted wage. The reservation frontier in wage and distance can be represented
as in Figure 1, here under the assumption of concave costs of distance c(τρ). The figure
also displays the proportions of each unemployment-employment trajectory from the data
used in next Section.2
2We use here the same notations as in previous sub-Section, as well as new notations for “wage stayers”
(w0) and “city stayers” (d0). Labels d+, d0 and d− therefore reflect the trajectories towards longer, identical
and shorter commuting distances respectively, while w+, w0 and w− represent trajectories towards jobs
paid more than +4% than the previous job, similar wages, that is in the interval (+4%;-4%) and finally
paid less than 4% than the previous job.
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Figure 1: Reservation Frontier and Acceptance-Rejection Areas.
Commute 
distance (𝑑) 
Wage (𝑤) 
Reservation frontier 
Rejected offers:  
low wage, high distance 
Previous 
 wage 
Previous 
workplace 
Accepted offers:  
high wage, low distance 
w+,d-: 14% 
w-,d+: 20%  w-,d-: 17%  
w+,d+: 19% 
Total : 24% 
of which 
w+,d0: 6% 
w-,d0: 7% 
w0,d+: 5% 
w0,d-: 4% 
w0,d0: 2% 
 
  
Notes: Percentages in reported on the Figure refer to the fraction in Austria of the newly employed individuals in each of the
quadrants defined by the wage/commute distance in their previous job. Source: author’s calculations from Section 3.
In the data, we do not directly observe the reservation distance but only accepted wages
and accepted commute distances. When the two distributions in wages and distances are
independent, it is possible to calculate conditional wages and their slope with respect to
commute distance with a simpler formula. In this specific case we have:
we(ρ) =
1
1− F (R(ρ))
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
wdF (w)
and the slope of we with respect to ρ is
∂we
∂ρ
=
c′(τρ).f(R(ρ))
[1− F (R(ρ))]2
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
wdF (w) +
−c′(τρ)R(ρ)f(R(ρ))
1− F (R(ρ))
=
f(R(ρ))c′(τρ)
1− F (R(ρ)) (w
e −R(ρ))
The slope is clearly positive, as accepted wages are above the reservation one at any given
distance. It is not linear and might be either convex or concave, depending on the features
of the wage distribution F (·).
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Geography and institutional background
Time and costs associated to commuting are relevant for the majority of Austrian workers.
Indeed, in the year 2001, 92% of the total workforce commuted and 86% of the total work-
force commuted daily. 67% of the daily commuter cover the major commuting distance by
car, 20% commute by public transport and 13% either walk or commute by bicyle. 68%
of the daily commuting individuals work in a different municipality than they live in. Yet,
80% stay within a political region (there are 99 political regions), hence many stay in the
same county, which means that mobility is limited in Austria. As people do not incur long
commutes on average, one concern for our analysis might be that individuals try to avoid
commuting by relocating. Although there can be benefits in terms of commuting, there is
certainly a cost involved in relocating. Compared to the US, residential mobility in Austria
is low. Fischer (2002) provides calculations for the US. For Austria, we calculate that less
than 6% (between 10-15% for the US) change the residential municipality and less than
1.6% (above 5% for the US) cross the county border annually. In particular in our sample,
less than 5% change the residence over the turn of unemployment3.
The geography of Austria adds to make it an interesting country to study commuting.
Austria is a relatively small country yet with potentially large commute distances due to
the presence of the Alps and the particular longitudinal shape: the maximum distance from
west to east is around 700 kilometers. Cutting through Mu¨nich in Germany, the distance
between the northwestern city of Bregenz to Wien (Vienna) is 618 kilometers and six hours
drive. The distance between the southern city of Klagenfurt to the northern city of Linz
is only 251km but it takes 3 hours to reach the other city given the mountains. Figure
2 plots Austria and the altitude of each municipality. The white lines constitute borders
of municipalities. The black lines depict the borders of NUTS3 regions. A dark colour
indicates that the municipality is high above sea level. Altitude ranges from 110 to 1600
meters above sea level. The Alps in the middle of the country are clearly visible as are
3Sources: CPS 2001 Statistik Austria, own calculations from tax records.
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the flat parts in the east towards Hungary. This variety in the terrain is likely to have an
impact on how individuals commute.
We will study the effects of unemployment insurance extensively. The unemployment
system in Austria, as in many other countries, consists of a first part where eligible individu-
als receive Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit (UB). The level of UI benefits is calculated
based on base earnings, where base earnings refer to average earnings in the baseline period.
The baseline period is the year t− 1 for job seekers who enter unemployment between July
and December of year t. The baseline period is the year t − 2 for job seekers who enter
unemployment from January to June in year t. Baseline earnings are multiplied with the
replacement rate to calculate unemployment benefits. Benefits are capped from below and
above, the cap being adjusted annually for inflation. We will exploit these caps to identify
the effects of unemployment benefits in our analysis below.
The potential duration of unemployment benefits (PBD) is a function of past work
experience and age. For instance, job seekers who have been working for a at least 3 out of
the previous 5 years, and are 40 years or older when registering for unemployment benefits
receive 39 weeks of unemployment benefits compared to 30 weeks if they are less than 40
years old.4 A similar discontinuity exists at age 50, where PBD increases from 39 to 52
weeks, for job seekers who worked 9 out of the previous 15 years.
Once unemployment benefits are exhausted, individuals are eligible for means tested
Unemployment Assistance (UA; Notstandshilfe) benefits. The means test includes in par-
ticular family income and wealth which makes it unlikely for many individuals to actually
get UA benefits. Conditional on getting UA benefits they can be fairly high, as much as
92% of UB. UA does not end, but job seekers need to re-apply for UA once every 26 weeks.
3.2 Data and Sample
We combine data from different sources to reach our final data set. First, the Austrian
Social Security Database (ASSD)5 contains detailed information on the work history for all
private sector workers from 1972 to present. It contains both a unique plant and person
4See Nekoei and Weber (2014) who analyze this discontinuity.
5See Zweimu¨ller et al. (2009) for a detailed description of the data set.
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Figure 2: Altitude of Municipalities
(900,1627] (743,900]
(623,743] (543,623]
(465.5,543] (398,465.5]
(336,398] (277,336]
(216,277] [117,216]
identifier. Second, the unemployment register contains detailed information on both UI and
UA benefits for the years 1988 to 2007. Third, we use data from a road trip planning firm
to measure travelling time between any two municipalities.6
To construct our data set we obtain all unemployment spells from the ASSD that last at
least for 7 days. For a given unemployment spell we figure out information about the last and
next (if there is one) employment spell. For the relevant employer-employee relation before
and after unemployment, we obtain the following variables: exact date of termination and
start of the relation, average daily wage (yearly contribution to the social security system
divided by the number of working days), geographic location (municipality-level7), industry
affiliation of the employer. For the individual we know the month of birth and gender and
we can calculate tenure on either job, experience, sickness, occupation (blue/white collar).
The two variables age and experience allow us to calculate the potential benefit duration
for UI benefits. Knowing this duration, we are able to distinguish between time of UI and
(potential) UA receipt for each unemployment spell. For each unemployment spell we
6Our data set only contains individuals who live and work in Austria. Hence we do miss commuters
across national borders. Official statistics suggest that we do not miss out many cases. From the census
2001, there are 3.6 millions individuals listed as employed of which 57,730 (1.59%) said they live in Austria
but work abroad, mostly in Germany. We know the precise number of Austrian cross border workers only
for Switzerland. Namely in 2013Q3 there were 8,119 Austrians who crossed the border at least once a week
to work in Switzerland. Back in 2002Q3 the figure was 6,985. Conversely, the tax data authority indicates
that of those who have to pay taxes in Austria, 5.8% live abroad and this latter number also includes
individuals temporarily living abroad.
7There were 2376 municipalities in 2014.
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know the exact duration on days. Furthermore, the data allow us to calculate the non-
employment duration. This is the number of days between the succeding and the previous
job. The ASSD data allow us to determine the basis on which benefit are calculated, which
is typically different from the previous wage. We can identify the unemployment spells form
the ASSD data in the unemployment register. From the unemployment register, we obtain
the municipality of residence, the UI and UA benefit level, education and information on
the family situation.
The third data set, road trip planning data from the year 2000, contains time and
distance in kilometers between any pair of municipalities. This distance is measured between
the centroids of the municipalities. Hence, for each unemployed individual we can calculate
previous and succeding distance to the workplace8.
We restrictthe analysis along some dimensions. First, we focus on unemployment spells
starting between January 1995 and December 2004. The main reason to start after 1994
is to avoid interactions with a major change in the unemployment system that extended
the potential benefit duration substantially for certain individuals9. Second, we include
individuals aged 20 to 54 at the start of unemployment. We do not want to include older
individuals to avoid interactions between unemployment and early retirement, which is
strong in Autria as assessed in Inderbitzin et al. (2013). Third, we exclude individuals with
a commute of more than two hours prior to unemployment. These are most likely weekly
commuters and may have a different search patterns relative to daily commuters, who are of
main interest in our study. Fourth, individuals who quit voluntarily10 and those who return
to the same employer are excluded. The particular data we use need two more restrictions.
First, the average daily wage we are measuring confounds hours and the wage rate. This is
a major problem for women but not for men. We focus on men because virtually all men
work fulltime. Second, the commuting time we measure is not door to door but municipality
to municipality. This is a potential source of measurement error which may be particularly
relevant in metropolitan areas, where the actual commuting time is highly affected by the
8Note that our data contains information on plant location. People who work in headquarters of firms
are not in our data as their municipality code is missing.
9See Lalive and Zweimueller (2004) for an analysis of this reform.
10Identified through a waiting period of 28 days.
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Figure 3: Average Commuting Time by Residency
(1.03,2.4] (.87,1.03]
(.76,.87] (.7,.76]
(.64,.7] (.53,.64]
(.48,.53] (.41,.48]
[0,.41]
exact location of residences and workplaces. As a robustness check, we exclude the largest
5 cities in Austria except Vienna, namely Graz, Linz, Salzburg, Innsbruck and Klagenfurt.
For Vienna we can identify the 23 districts and treat each of them as single municipalities.
This is not possible for the other cities.
A first look at the structure of commuting in Austria is given in Figures 3 and 4. Figure
3 illustrates commuting time by place of residence. It is evident that individuals who live in
mountaineous areas commute longer. Those who live in flatter areas (north east) or valleys
(west) experience shorter commutes. Hence, workers do trade-off distances with amenities
(e.g. living in the countryside). If we draw the same picture not by municipality of residence
but municipality of work (Figure 4), we do not see such a clear geographical pattern: for
each workplace, there is a more balanced distribution of commute time and we do not find
strong evidence of concentration in space of larger commute times by workplace.
3.3 Stylized facts on wage and commute changes
We report in Table 2 the summary statistics for the full sample (154,677 spells). We also
split these statistics for each of the four possible outcomes (where w+, w−, d+, d− rep-
resent, respectively, workers experiencing a transition from a lower to a higher paid job
(w+), workers experiencing a transition from a higher to a lower paid job (w−), workers
experiencing a transition from a closer job to a job further away (d+), and finally workers
experiencing a transition from a job further away to a closer job (d−). The latter subset also
18
Figure 4: Average Commuting Time by Workplace
(.86,3.8] (.7,.86]
(.61,.7] (.54,.61]
(.49,.54] (.44,.49]
(.4,.44] (.33,.4]
(.23,.33] [0,.23]
includes workers who find a job at the same distance, denoted hereafter by d0: conditional
on changes, there is a 16% mass of people remaining in the same city before and after a
transition through unemployment.
Workers, on average, spend 25 weeks in non-employment; those who find a wage at least
as high as the last wage spend 20 to 21 weeks in non-employment. Individuals finding a
job at the same distance as the previous job are non-employed on average for 22 weeks.
Workers finding a job at a different location are non-employed on average for a longer time
(about 24 weeks). The number of weeks in registered unemployment is smaller (row 2),
around 15 to 20 weeks. We also calculate potential benefit duration, which is around 32
weeks (row 3). The average replacement rate is around 40% for unemployment benefits
in the unemployment regime (UI, row 4). Data also include information on the amount
under an assistance regime (UA), which we will introduce in the next Section to enrich the
model. Row 5 gives the mean replacement rate including zeros (that is, for workers eligible
to the regular unemployment insurance regime) and row 6 gives the mean replacement rate
for workers under the UA regime. The replacement rate of the UA regime is close to the
UI regime. Indeed, once UA is granted, it amounts to around 90% of UI benefits which
translates into the lower replacement rate despite the fact that the sample is much different
- UI is populated by higher wage workers.
Previous daily wage is 59.98 euros (full sample); the next wage is 57.67 after exiting
non-employment. For those getting a higher wage, the new wage is 67; for wage losers,
19
instead, the mean wage is around 50 euros. Previous commute time is .443 of an hour (that
is 0.438x60=26.58 minutes one way). Commute time after is 0.62 of an hour, almost 40mn.
On average those who commute more now commute around an hour; those who commute
less commute 0.298 of an hour, that is 18 minutes.
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In Figure 5 we take a closer look at the distribution of commute and wage changes
between any two jobs spaced out by an unemployment spell. The first and the second rows
represent the distribution of commute and wage changes, respectively, in levels (left panel)
and in logs (right panel). The dispersion is quite large; in relative terms, given that the
mean commute time is about 30 minutes, it turns out that the typical dispersion is higher
for commute distances. From the left panels we can notice that commuting times are right
skewed, while wages are symmetric.
The third row of Figure 5 also reports in the scatter plot of changes in log wages and
commuting distance changes per unemployment status: we distinguish between individuals
who find a new job while they are receiving unemployment benefits (black circles) and indi-
viduals who find a job only after they have exhausted unemploymet benefits and eventually
receive unemployment assistance benefits (crosses). In both cases, the correlation appears
to be positive: higher changes in commute time are associated with larger wage gains while
lower commute distances are typically associated with negative wage growth between the
previous and the next job. This scatter plot is first evidence that time until a job is found
matters: those finding a job under the UA regime face a lower net wage growth conditional
on distance change or vice versa.
We finally report the conditional densities of the sample in the cross section of accepted
jobs, in Figure 6. The joint density of accepted wages and commuting times shows a peak
at 57 Euros wage per day, and about 32 minutes of commuting time (top left and right sub-
graphs). Jobs that offer higher wages and longer commutes, or lower wages, and shorter
commutes are also quite frequent. This is the pattern we saw in the previous figure.
22
Figure 5: Changes in Commuting Time and Wage from the empirical data analysis. Com-
mute distances are measured in hours. Daily wages are measured in euros.
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Figure 6: Joint Density Distributions from the empirical data analysis on Austrian data.
Commute distances are measured in hours. Daily wages are measured in euros.
3.4 Empirical hazard rates and competing risks analysis: more
wage cuts and less “city stayers” over time
With similar notations as in the theory part and in Table 2, we separate out transitions
of workers towards a larger distance job (d+), those staying in the same city (d0) and
finally those facing a decline in commute distance (d−). Similarly for wages, we separate
out workers facing transition to a higher wage (w+) and a lower wage (w−) and define
transition to the same wage (w0) if the new wage is within a range of 4% around the old
wage.
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The results are presented in Figure 7; it displays the profile of the hazard rate for the non-
employment duration in the data. The unemployment exit hazard rate reaches a maximum
between two to six months before it declines continuously. This could be because job seekers
entering unemployment apply for jobs right away but need to wait until they receive a job
offer. This is true for overall exits (top chart) and for each of the destinations (middle and
lower chart).
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Figure 7: Empirical Hazard Rates by Exit State
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Our theory for job search in space predicted that relative hazards inform on search
strategies. We now establish a few stylized facts related to the “competing risks”, to assess
how the different sub-hazards relate to each other over time. We proceed as follows. We
first estimate sub-hazards using Cox-Regression defined by the type of job an individual
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finds11. We distinguish better paying jobs, worse paying jobs, and about equal paying jobs.
The about equal paying category means the new wage is up to 4% above or below the
previous job. We introduce this category to deal with the issue that we do not know for
sure whether job seekers would accept the previous job. In a second step, we build relative
hazard rates. For instance, we calculate the relative hazard of wages by dividing the hazard
estimate for w− by the hazard estimate for w+ telling us how the relative probability to
end up in relatively worse jobs behaves over time. The same can be done with distances.
The relative hazards are illustrated in Figure 8. Each plot includes the unconditional
relative hazard ratios (black lines in the graphs), as well as the hazard ratio after controlling
for some observable characteristics (red solid line). The latter is a prediction from a Cox-
Estimation where we control for a variety of observed characteristics presented in Table 2.
The black dashed lines are the corresponding 95% confidence interval.
The upper left panel relates exits in worse paid jobs to exits in better paid jobs. As
expected, the relative likelihood that individuals leave into worse paid jobs increases with
the duration of non-employment. This is evidence that reservation wages are declining over
time, consistent with job search theory when workers loose eligibility. Degen (2014) finds a
very similar pattern for accepted wages in Austria. This result, well known, is in line with
a large body of evidence in other countries. Further, the left panel in the second row shows
that this arises mostly from strong wage cuts: the relative hazard w − /w0 goes up, while
the left panel in the third row shows stability over time of w0/w+.
The upper right graph relates exits into jobs farther away to jobs that are closer to home.
Both the unconditional and the conditional relative hazards are almost flat. This implies
that the succeding job can be either closer or farther away from home. This ratio is 1.5 and
stable over time, meaning that there is a larger fraction of distance losers (d+). This may be
surprising since one would perhaps have expected, parallel to the decline in the reservation
wage over time, that workers could face an increase in their reservation distance; this may
suggest the absence of action along the distance margin. However, this interpretation is
11Note that doing so does not mean we split the sample by wage or distance, the type of job an individual
finds merely defines which sub-hazard this inividual contributes to estimating. We follow standard practice
in competing risks estimation.
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wrong, as indicated in the subsequent rows. The reason is not the insentivity of the distance
margin, but rather due to the fact that hazard rates away from the previous city actually
evolve relative to the hazard of the “city stayers”. This hazard rate account for the 16%
of individuals in our sample who do not change the commuting distance in the new job as
compared to the old job.
In fact, the unexpected result uncovered here is that the pattern of search with respect
to the previous city varies quite a lot over time. Indeed, we obtain instead quite strong
trends in relative hazard ratios where the denominator is the hazard rate of city stayers, as
shown in the right panel in the second and third rows. The second row (right panel) relates
exits into farther away jobs to exits into jobs at the same distance. Overall, there is a larger
portion of unemployed individuals finding a new job farther away than staying in the same
city. The proportion of “distance losers” (d+) relative to stayers (d0) goes up over time. For
workers experiencing such a move to a more distant city, this is indeed a change upward of
the reservation distance strategy, that may be explained by a decline in the unemployment
insurance. We also find a positive trend in time for the “distance winners” (d−) relative to
stayers (d0) (third row, right panel): individuals are indeed relatively more likely to find a
job in the same place at the beginning of the non-employment duration than to move closer
to home. This suggests that workers tend to search first for jobs in their previous workplace
before searching jobs closer to home. As time goes however, some workers give in and get
closer, possibly sacrificing on wages. Overall, it is relatively more likely to find a job in the
same place at the beginning of the non-employment duration than towards the end of the
non-employment duration.
There are various possible interpretations of the above results, that the old workplace
is a relevant margin for job search, especially at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
Jobs are typically concentrated in space, e.g. finance jobs in the capital, and job seekers
have work experience in only a few industries. Job seekers in spatially concentrated in-
dustries are more likely to find a job in the same city as before, until they change sector
if unsuccessful. In that case, they also change their area of search and therefore move to
another city. Another explanation would be that unemployed workers have more informa-
tion about the old workplace e.g. through informal search channels. Both explanations
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Figure 8: Relative conditional hazard rates from empirical data analysis
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can be true simultaneously and would produce the same observable consequences. We have
explored these explanations by conducting the same analysis for workers who work in ge-
graphically clustered industries as opposed to workers who work in geographically uniformly
distributed industries. We obtain similar results for both types of industries, suggesting that
the information channel is important.
3.5 The impact of unemployment benefits on hazard rates: iden-
tification strategy
We will estimate a basic Cox-model of the sub-hazard rates. Our particular focus here is
on identifying the effects of three unemployment insurance parameters on the nature of
jobs individuals accept. The identification of the effects of unemployment benefits, benefit
duration, and unemployment assistance is obtained as follows.
First, unemployment benefits are determined by previous earnings. The benefit schedule
exhibits two kinks as in Card et al. (2012), one at the bottom of insured earnings and one
at the top of insured earnings. Conditional on previous earnings and other observables, the
remaining variation in unemployment benefits mainly stems from the presence of the kinks.
If individuals cannot manipulate previous earnings to shift themselves beyond one of the
kinks, the variation in unemployment benefits generated by the kink can be assumed to be
exogenous. Importantly, the earnings that constitute the benefit base are not necessarily the
ones where the job was lost. The relevant earnings to determine unemployment benefits are
either from the previous year or two years before, depending on when the individual starts
claiming unemployment benefits. It is hardly possible for job seekers to manipulate the
relevant previous earnings that ultimately determine the level of unemployment benefits.
Second, similar reasoning holds for the potential duration of unemployment benefits
(PBD). PBD depends on previous work experience and age with discontinuous changes
after several work experience thresholds, and two age thresholds (40 years and 50 years).
Our strategy to exploit those changes is to add flexible functions of previous work experience
and age into the Cox-regressions. Appendix Figure C.2 documents the non-linearities used
in the strategy. Recall that the coefficient of a regressor in the multiple regression model is
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the partial correlation of that regressor with the dependent variable. The bottom graph of
Figure C.2 shows PBD after all regressors in the model, including work experience and age,
have been partialled out. The residual is close to zero almost everywhere, except at age 40
and age 50. PBD exhibits discrete jumps at these ages, thus identifiying the coefficient on
PBD. PBD effects are identified from the age and previous work experience discontinuities
in PBD.
We are not aware of a quasi-experimental design for unemployment assistance. We use
the observed level of unemployment assistance conditioning on some potential determinants
of unemployment assistance receipt (marital status, previous wage).
3.6 Evidence of disincentive effects
Table 3 displays the effects of the level of benefits from unemployment insurance B and from
assistance b on hazard rates. Column 1 displays the results while controlling for the effect
of benefits under the UI regime (B) and potential benefit duration (PBD). The sign on the
hazard rate is strongly negative. The effect of potential benefit duration is also negative
and significant. The regressions include a number of other factors, including tenure profiles,
marital status and family composition, as well as provincial dummies (NUTS3), industry
dummies, altitude, and year effects12.
The second column introduces further the value of unemployment assistance (b) for those
having exhausted their UI rights. So B measures the replacement rate for job seekers on
UI, and b is the replacement on unemployment assitance for job seekers on assistance. In
this specification, potential benefit duration captures the number of weeks remaining before
exhausting benefits. Both levels of UI (B) and UA (b) reduce the hazard rate, although the
effect of b is smaller than B. The effect of PBD is still negative but less so.
The next columns investigate which sub-hazards are more strongly affected by changes
in the unemployment insurance parameters. Making UI more generous should not affect
exits to good jobs (paying a higher wage), except via reduced search intensity. Indeed,
point estimates for UI benefits and assistance are small in column (w+). More generous
12Table C.1 in the appendix shows the full set of covariates.
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unemployment insurance makes exits to jobs that pay the same or worse much less likely
(columns w− or w0). So, making UI more generous improves chances that job seekers find
a better paid job, relative to finding a worse paid job.
Regarding the links between UI and distance, one would expect more generous UI to
reduce the rate of leaving to jobs further away from home (column d+). This is true for
potential benefit duration which reduces the rate of accepting jobs far away from home.
However, for benefits, we do not see that increasing UI reduces exists to jobs further away
from home. Instead, increased UI reduces the rate of leaving for a job in the same city
(column d0), relative to jobs closer or farther away from home. This might be because
increased UI facilitates job search in new areas. UI benefits enlarge the search radius
around the previous city. All estimates attached to UI generosity display negative signs,
this reflecting the effect of UI on search intensity. The impact of UI and UA on joint wage
and distance changes is displayed for completeness in Appendix Table C.2.
Table 4 offers a summary of the differential effects of benefits and assistance on changes
in distance and wages, where the reference is staying in the same city and at a wage within
the -4%/+4% range. Interestingly, benefits and assistance raise significantly the occurence
of the outcome “higher wage”; benefits reduce the occurrence of the outcome “lower wage”,
assistance being unsignificant here. Further, netting out the d− coefficients to the d0 coef-
ficients, it appears that benefits increase the likelihood to get closer to home than staying
in the same city; and, for wage increases and wage stability (first two rows), netting out
the d+ coefficients to the d0 coefficients implies that benefits increase the likelihood to get
further away to home than staying in the same city.
In summary, in a majority of cases, unemployment insurance reduces reservation wages
at a given distance, and promotes search outside the same city, especially closer to home, as
expected, but also further away, which is per se a less expected result. Appendix D explores
whether this may be due to credit constraints. Evidence lightly points out in this direction
(see Appendix Table D.3).
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Table 4: Coefficients from Table C.2, relative to exit (w0, d0)
Benefits Assistance
d+ d0 d− d+ d0 d−
w+ 1.49??? 1.177??? 1.508??? 0.529?? 0.533? 0.539??
w0 0.454
??? 0 0.348?? 0.491? 0 0.226
w− -0.694??? -0.585??? -0.758??? 0.22 0.412 0.241
Notes: The table summarizes estimates from a competing risk Cox regression to each combination
of wage and distance destination. The table reports coefficients on unemployment benefits (B)
and unemployment assistance (b) relative to the coefficient estimated for the constant wage and
same municipality of residence destination (w0,d0). Significance is indicated as follows: *(p<0.1),
**(p<0.05), *** (p<0.01).
4 Extending the model to account for the empirical
facts
This Sections enriches the model to take stock of these finding. It adds several dimensions
to the previous analysis in Section 2. In particular, it shows how to account in a simple
way:
1. for the existence of potential credit market imperfections;
2. for the local dimension of job search, and the particular role of the previous workplace
that seems to be central in the Austrian case;
3. it also extends the model to the existence of two unemployment compensation profiles,
insurance and assistance.
4.1 Mild liquidity constraints, unemployment and the role of ben-
efits
The previous results were derived under the assumption that agents face no liquidity con-
straint. Under the assumption of a search cost taking the form C(D,λ) = M(D) + e(λ,D),
where the first part may be thought as a monetary component and the second part as disu-
tility of effort and distance, this requires that the income from benefits and other assets
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is larger than the financial cost, or that the unemployed workers may borrow at the same
rate as the employed workers save. Indeed, this assumes that the rate of interest r is the
same for borrowers (the unemployed) and savers (some of the employed). Another “almost
equivalent” assumption is that the unemployed workers who have just been laid-off either
still have financial assets or full access to financial liquidity. In that case, the situation of
the newly unemployed workers is similar to that of the employed workers, which was our
working hypothesis so far.
We represent this alteration with the assumption that the newly unemployed workers
have access to the same rate of interest for a random time, and under some Poisson intensity
process, undergo a drop in their financing capacity.
In that case, a mild liquidity constraint is that they face a higher interest rate r+ but may
still borrow at this rate and therefore, choose the optimal range of search. Another extreme
assumption is that these unemployed workers, after being hit by a financial constraint,
cannot even borrow and face a strict liquidity constraint, under which their current income
must equal their spendings: consumption and monetary search costs. We do not detail
the model solutions in this case since we do not find strong evidence in favor of such strict
constraints in the data and only leave this for the Appendix (sub-section B.2). These
unemployed workers must now discount the future at their rate of pure time preference, and
r+ must now be interpreted as such a rate, going say from 4% a year to 20% a year.
In other words, the newly unemployed workers are decumulating assets and make optimal
search decisions; following a financial shock unemployed workers have no longer any asset
and must either borrow at a higher rate or face cash-constraints and discount the future at
their rate of time preference.
Lemma 3 (unemployment benefits impact). i) In the absence of liquidity constraints,
an increase in unemployment benefits increases the value of unemployment by a factor 1/r.
ii) Under mild liquidity constraints, the impact is 1/r+ and thus smaller.
The proof of the impact of unemployment benefits on the value of unemployment is also
in Appendix B.2 in all possible cases.
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4.2 Introducing two levels of unemployment compensation
Now, we assume that there are two levels of benefits: B (insurance) and b (assistance).
Workers switch randomly from B to b at Poisson rate α13. The value of unemployment
depends on the eligibility status; let Uc and U be these values for workers covered by UI and
by UA, respectively, and ρ the commute distance. Let λ and λc be the arrival rates of job
offers per unit of superficy, and first simplify the exposition in treating λ and λc as simple
parameters. As already shown in Section 2, the optimal values of λ can be easily calculated
once the optimal search radius D∗ has been chosen.
We also assume that the financial constraint of the unemployed gets more severe as time
goes. However, instead of assuming that agents can accumulate and decumulate wealth,
we make the simplifying assumption, already discussed in Section 4.1, that individuals face
a higher rate of discount after a Poisson shock; although in principle the loss of eligibility
to unemployment insurance and the more difficult access to liquidity are distinct stochastic
processes, we assume that they occur simultaneously, which simplifies the derivation of the
model. Then, we simply assume that the covered unemployed workers access to credit at
rate rc, which is lower than that the rate r faced by the uncovered workers. We also assume
that search effort dimensions (here D only) and consumption are non-separable, with an
interaction term proportional to parameters δ and δc; δ (δc) positive (negative) means that
the disutility of distance is lower (higher) for higher income recipients. The full derivation
of the extended model can be found in Appendix A.2.
4.2.1 Reservation wage profiles under two unemployment regimes
The following Lemma highlights how job seekers change their reservation wage when switch-
ing from the UI to the UA regime.
Lemma 4. Assuming δ = δc and r = rc, the reservation wage for a given distance is higher
for eligible unemployed workers than for uneligible workers. The difference is in(de)creasing
13Many real world UI systems are not stationary, e.g. unemployment benefits run out after a fixed
number of months. Non-stationarity can matter for job search behavior, as studies on benefit exhaustion
show (Meyer (1990)). Card et al. (2007b) discuss end of benefit behavior and find it matters much less than
earlier studies would suggest. Our specification buys us simplicity at a reasonable cost.
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in commute distance if δ < (>)0.
Rc(ρ)−R(ρ) = rc + s
1 + δτρ
(Uc − U) > 0. (7)
We can grasp the main intuition by focusing on the simple case with separability between
monetary income and distance and linear commute distance cost function. In this case, we
already proved that reservation wages are linear in the commute distance and the marginal
rate of substitution is constant, denoted by τ . In this case, the linearity comes from the
fact that wages enter linearly in the utility function and that commute costs are linear in
distance. It follows that the reservation frontier in wage and distance is linear, and can be
represented as such in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Theoretical Reservation Frontiers and Acceptance-Rejection Areas
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4.3 Directing search towards the previous city
The main insight of the previous empirical part is that workers seem to search first in
the previous city, and then extend their range of search. We want to give a theoretical
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counterpart to this complex job strategy. Assume now that workers can target the effort
strategy λ differentially in space, contrary to what was assumed before. To keep things
relatively simple, we assume that workers can distribute their search effort either in the
previous city (with intensity of arrival of offers λ0) or in any other city within the range D
(with intensity of arrival of offers λ). Because space is continuous in our setting, we define
the previous workplace as a range of values centered on the mean of the distance distribution
(d0): the lower and the upper bounds of the range are denoted as d0−and d0+ , respectively.
The optimal search strategy is therefore six-tuple (D, Dc, λ
0, λ0c , λ, λc). The first order
conditions for the optimal search radius stay as in the benchmark model (see equation 18
and 19). The new first order conditions on optimal search intensity are reported in Appendix
A.3.
The specification we adopt for the cost functions is the following:
C(D,λ, λ0) = τD + c0Dηc + cλ
[
γλ
0
(λ0)ηλ + (λ)ηλ
]
C ′λ(D,λ, λ
0) = cληλ(λ)
ηλ−1; C ′λ0(D,λ, λ
0) = cλγλ
0
ηλ(λ
0)ηλ−1;
As regards the part of the search cost which depends on distance (D), we assume that
it is made by two components: the first one is a monetary component, and the second
one is a convex function which represents agent’s disutility from searching farther away
from residence. The cost of search effort only presents a convex disutility component. As
discussed in Section 4.1, the monetary component of the search cost (summarized by τ)
enters the agent’s budget constraint. In this way we can study the case of binding liquidity
constraints, which leads to sub-optimal choices of the radius of search. Regarding the
disutility component, c0 and cλ are the weights of the distance and the effort dimensions,
respectively. ηc and ηλ are the elasticities of the subjective part of the cost function to these
two search margins. Furthermore,γλ
0
captures how costly is the search effort in the previous
workplace relatively to search outside. We assume γλ
0
< 1 to indicate that the search
efficiency is likely to be larger in the previous workplace, either for industry concentration
or for existing social networks.
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Furthermore, covered workers are assumed to be relatively more efficient in searching
in the previous workplace (γλ
0
c < γ
λ0): in absence of other dimensions of heterogeneity,
the asymmetry in the search cost is needed to rationalize the empirical observations that
covered workers exit unemployment more quickly and they are relatively more “city stayers”.
Moreover, there are several empirical reasons that may justify this choice: shorter non-
employment spells are often associated with a richer human and social capital and are
considered as a positive signal by potential employers.
5 Calibration of the richer model and the role of policy
parameters
5.1 Calibration parameters and summary of the main variables
As Figure 7 showed, the hazard rates decrease over time. This may arise due to: i) discour-
agement from job seekers as time goes - e.g time varying search costs; ii) lower quality of
job offers due to the exhaustion of offers in the initial pool of search (e.g. the same city); iii)
a stigma effect from being long-term unemployed and thus less efficient search as time goes;
iv) more impatient workers over time, hence reducing their search effort; v) illiquid workers
who cannot afford paying for the optimal search effort and who restrict their range of search;
vi) finally, heterogeneity of workers and a composition effect in the pool, so that those less
efficient dominate over time. Mechanisms ii) and iii) are for instance assessed in Kroft et al.
(2013), who find a negative association between the length of elapsed unemployment spells
and the likelihood to obtain a job interview.
We therefore enrich the model with a set of assumptions encompassing these various
mechanisms and consistent with these interpretations. Assume the existence of two types
of unemployed workers: covered workers are entitled to benefits B, and uncovered workers
are assistance recipients b < B . Covered workers are assumed to face a relative higher
efficiency of search in the same city, while uncovered workers face instead a less efficient
search effort. This hypothesis captures the first three explanations of the declining hazard
rate listed above. Additionally, covered unemployed workers face a lower rate of interest
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and are thus more patient and search ceteris paribus more; the uncovered, under assistance,
face a higher rate of interest and search less. This assumption is consistent with previous
point iv). Appendix B.2 extends the model in the direction indicated by point v). We do
not explicitly address point vi), instead. Hence, as time goes, we observe both a decline in
the absolute hazard rate and, under adequate choice of the relative efficiency of search in
the same city, a decrease over time of the hazard rate in the same city relative to the hazard
rate outside the city.
We then choose the various parameters so as to replicate the qualitative results on
hazards, relative hazards and sub-hazards as in Section 2. The full calibration is reported
in Table 5. The rate of interest is set to 4% annually for the employed workers and for
the covered unemployed workers (under UI), and at 12% for the uncovered workers (under
UA). The discount in the search cost of prospecting in the same city is γλ
0
c =0.07 for covered
workers, but that comparative advantage of the previous city decreases for the uncovered
workers and that discount parameter goes to γλ
0
=0.14 instead. Further details on the
calibration strategy are relegated to Appendix A.5.
Table 6 reports the main equilibrium variables of the model. The simulated reservation
frontier, the counterpart of the theoretical Figure 1, is instead represented in Figure 10:
since we assume a negative δ = δc and a linear cost function, the reservation frontier turns
out to be convex. The blue and the red vertical lines represent the radius of search for
uncovered and covered workers, respectively.
An outcome of the model is that covered workers ask for higher wages (Rc > R)
14, search
closer (Dc < D) and search more intensely (λc > λ; λ
0
c > λ
0). The higher search intensity
of covered workers is due to their comparatively higher efficiency, as stressed in the previous
section. This allows them to exit unemployment more quickly (hazc > haz). Moreover,
job seekers under the UI regime are more likely to find a job in the previous workplace, as
evident from the higher fraction of city stayers among covered workers.
14More exactly, covered workers have a higher reservation frontier: their reservation wage is higher for
any given commute distance. The figures reported in Table 6 are the reservation wages calculated at D.
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Table 5: Calibration
Parameter Description Value
r discount rate 0.01
s separation rate 0.004
c0 cost of search (distance) 5.00
cλ = cλc cost of search effort 80000
ηc, ηλ elasticity of the search effort cost 1.50
γλ0 cost of search in the same city 0.07
δ = δc complementarity between income
and distance
-0.20
Policy parameters
B Unemployment Insurance (UI) 20.59
b Unemployment Assistance (UA) 1.76
1/α Potential Benefit Duration 5.00
τ unit commuting cost 1.00
Wage and distance distributions
µF = µFc mean wage 58.84
σF = σFc sd wage 18.90
µG = µGc mean distance 0.47
σG = σGc sd distance 0.47
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Table 6: Main endogenous variables of the calibrated model
Covered Not covered
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 64.75 60.25
Average distance (min) 25.51 25.84
Hazard rate 0.1126 0.0467
Rejection rate 0.012 0.003
Share city stayers 18.88 5.12
Unemployment 0.012 0.051
Decisions
Reservation wage 43.63 33.03
Search radius (min) 71.08 73.84
Effort outside d0 0.0030 0.0020
Effort inside d0 0.0200 0.0100
Sub-hazard rates
sub− haz(w+, d+) 0.0098 0.0052
sub− haz(w−, d+) 0.0096 0.0064
sub− haz(w+, d−) 0.0256 0.0131
sub− haz(w−, d−) 0.0295 0.0166
sub− haz(w+, d0) 0.0182 0.0024
sub− haz(w−, d0) 0.0199 0.0030
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Figure 10: Simulated reservation frontiers
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Notes: The vertical dashed line is the previous city (d0); the vertical red (resp. blue) solid line is the optimal range of search
of covered unemployed workers D∗c (resp. of uncovered workers D∗). Distance is measured in hours.
5.2 Search strategies, hazard and relative hazards as a function
of non-employment spells
Figures 11 and 12 plot the results of the simulations. The model performs relatively well
under different dimensions. First, we are able to replicate the decrease in the absolute
hazard and in the sub-hazard rates (Figure 11). Second, we match the empirical result that
the share of workers exiting unemployment as wage loosers is increasing over time (column
one in row two of Figure 11). Third, the model can account for the fact that agents are more
likely to expand the radius of search the more time they spend into unemployment (column
2 in row two of Figure 11). Fourth, agents exhaust job offers inside the previous workplace
as time goes. In summary, the lower part of Figure 11 shows that the extended model
qualitatively accounts well for the empirical dynamics of sub-hazards that were depicted in
Figure 8.
The underlying mechanisims of the model are represented in Figure 12: as time goes, the
reservation wage R goes down and the search radius D on average increases. This happens
because covered workers search closer and are more picky regarding the wage. The right
panel of Figure 12, however, shows a new finding: a large part of the action here also comes
from the changes over time of the hazard rate for the category of “city stayers” d0, that is
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people getting job offers in the same city where they used to work. This is an interesting
finding, because it suggests that two spatial margins matter: a) the commute distance,
based on search strategy D centered around the city of residence; b) the targeted search
strategy λ but especially λ0, that may temporarily be centered around the previous city of
work.
5.3 Comparison of calibration moments with the data
The map of densities of hazard rates in the cross-section of unemployed workers repre-
sented in Figure 13 in the distance-wage space, for both covered and uncovered workers, are
quite similar to the equivalent empirical densities in Figure 6. One can also represent the
“predicted” accepted wages in the model for both covered and uncovered workers. This cor-
responds to the solid and dashed lines in Figure 14. The solid line for covered workers is close
to the empirical observations. The dashed line for uncovered workers is higher compared
to the empirical observations. This suggests that our model may capture well the effects
of unemployment insurance but less so the effects of unemployment assistance. This gives
room for improvement of the calibration exercise, introducing more ex ante heterogeneity
in the pool of uncovered workers (those under UA).
Figure 13: Joint Density Distributions from simulations of the extended theory. Commute
distances are measured in hours. Daily wages are measured in euros.
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Figure 11: Simulated hazard rates from the extended theory. Black solid line: total hazard.
Dashed colored line: sub-hazards, summing up to total hazards
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Figure 12: Search strategies from the extended theory. Reservation wage, search radius and
relative intensity of effort in the same cuty (λ0) relative to other cities (λ)
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Figure 14: Changes in Commuting Time and Wage: data (stars and dots) and simulations
from extended theory (solid and dash lines).
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5.4 Policy implications from the calibration
The next stage is to describe the comparative statics of unemployment insurance for agents
subject to mild liquidity constraints. In what follows, we will explore systematically the
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comparative statics of B, b and Potential Benefit Duration (1/α) on the main endogenous
variables of the model, the reservation strategies and distance search as well as employment
and unemployment. In Appendix B.2 we further consider the case of agents who are strictly
liquidity constrained and compare the difference in the search behaviour implied by the
calibration exercise.
Figure 15 shows the response of the main variables of the model to a variation of the
policy parameters, namely the unemployment insurance enjoyed by covered workers (B), the
unemployment benefit received by workers who lost the insurance (b) andPotential Benefit
Duration (PBD).
Variation of B and PBD often have opposite effects on covered (on UI) and uncovered
(on UA) workers. Increases in B and PBD make the covered workers choosier: they decrease
their radius of search and their reservation wage increases. Furthermore, they reduce the
search intensity both inside and outside the previous workplace. The joint effect is a reduc-
tion in the hazard rate for covered workers. On the contrary, B has no disincentive effect on
uncovered workers, since they do not actually receive it. We can observe a mild entitlement
effect instead: B raises the value of re-employment and therefore the effort made by uncov-
ered workers to find a job. The result of a larger B on uncovered workers is therefore that
D increases as long as the search effort increases, while R decreases. As a result, uncovered
workers are more likely to exit unemployment. Changes in b makes both types of workers
choosier, leading to a reduction of the hazard rate for both types of searchers.
Table 7 presents the elasticities of outcomes and decisions with respect to the parameters
of the unemployment insurance system. Consider, first, the effects of increasing the unem-
ployment benefit level for covered job seekers. Accepted wages and commuting distance
display only a small reaction, but the unemployment exit hazard decreases, so unemploy-
ment duration increases, and job seekers reject more wage offers. Why does unemployment
duration increase? The reservation wage barely increases, explaining the small increase in
rejections, but the search radius decreases substantially. Moreover, job seekers search less,
both inside the previous workplace, and outside it.
Changes to the duration of unemployment benefits also affect covered job seekers directly.
Increasing the duration of benefits increases wages somewhat, and reduces commuting dis-
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Table 7: Elasticities from simulations of the extended theory
Covered job seekers Uncovered job seekers
B b PBD B b PBD
Observed outcomes
Average wage -0.00707 0.00091 0.02100 -0.00017 0.00081 -0.00105
Average distance -0.03718 -0.00182 -0.05775 0.00038 -0.00591 0.00238
Hazard rate -0.08693 -0.01569 -0.40646 0.00314 -0.02832 0.01993
Rejection rate 0.02072 0.01303 0.24616 -0.00884 0.06527 -0.05663
Share city stayers -0.00718 0.00349 0.24564 0.04675 0.00327 -0.34502
Unemployment 0.02950 0.00384 0.75683 0.02634 0.03240 -0.20575
Decisions
Reservation wage 0.01606 0.00418 0.09902 -0.00150 0.01181 -0.00957
Search radius -0.10222 -0.00519 -0.14854 0.00112 -0.01752 0.00710
Effort outside d0 -0.07389 -0.01310 -0.33641 0.00283 -0.02460 0.01796
Effort inside d0 -0.04779 -0.01243 -0.31006 0.00264 -0.02078 0.01678
Notes: The elasticity of y with respect to x is defined as
(
∆y
y
)
/
(
∆x
x
)
. Elasticities are computed from simulations, considering
the following policy changes: ∆B from 40 to 50 % of the previous wage; ∆b from 8% to 10% of the benchmark B; ∆ PBD 30
to 39 weeks.
tance. The unemployment exit hazard decreases substantially, rejections increase, more
people work in the previous workplace, and more people are unemployed. Job seekers in-
crease their reservation wage strongly, and decreases their search radius. Search intensity
also plummets, both inside and outside the previous workplace.
Changes in unemployment assistance, b, affect covered job seekers only once their benefits
have run out. Covered job seekers react to unemployment assistance changes in a way that
mimics unemployment insurance, B, but elasticities are smaller because job seekers discount
the future changes in unemployment assistance. Forward-looking job seekers do take changes
to the social assistance level into account.
Table 7 also shows results for uncovered job seekers. Changes in unemployment assis-
tance affect uncovered job seekers directly. Assistance levels have small effects on accepted
wages, and distances, but lower the unemployment exit hazard considerably. Uncovered job
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seekers reject more wage offers, and unemployment increases, once the unemployment as-
sistance level is increased. Uncovered job seekers leave unemployment less quickly because
they search less, both inside and outside the previous workplace. The reservation wage
increases somewhat, and the search radius decreases, but the elasticities are a bit smaller
than the effort elasticities.
Uncovered job seekers could also be affected by changes in the benefits levels and dura-
tions of covered job seekers because, by leaving unemployment, uncovered job seekers gain
entitlement to regular unemployment benefits. Yet, the entitlement effect of raising the
benefit level is small for uncovered job seekers. Elasticities are essentially zero. Changes to
potential benefit duration have somewhat larger effects for uncovered job seekers, especially
on the share city stayers and unemployment.
We would like to stress three insights from these simulations. First, studying average
wages and average commuting distances will not necessarily provide information on the
underlying decisions. Wages and commuting distances move less than reservation wages and
search radius. Second, studying how many job seekers work in the same workplace as prior to
unemployment is potentially revealing about the allocation of effort. The ”share city stayers”
reacts strongly to changes in potential benefit duration but not at all to changes in the benefit
level with corresponding changes in search effort. Third, benefit levels affect outcomes
less strongly than corresponding changes in the duration of unemployment benefits. This
is interesting and somewhat counter-intuitive since changes to the unemployment benefit
duration have no immediate impacts on covered job seekers. But job seekers are forward
looking and the threat of loosing benefit payments changes decisions already well ahead.
This finding, based on simulations, is in line with empirical studies on the effects of potential
benefit duration vs benefit duration, e.g.Lalive et al. (2006).
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Figure 15: Policy effects on search strategies from extended theory
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6 Summary and conclusion
Taking the wage-commute distance arbitrage seriously, the paper has developed and then
enriched a search model where the unemployed choose a range over which to search, an
intensity of search in that area and how to allocate search effort in a particular city (their
previous workplace). This model allows us to define the main concepts and to discipline the
empirical analysis. It additionally clarifies the efficiency role for unemployment insurance,
namely to alleviate the liquidity constraints of the unemployed. Indeed, if search in space
is costly not only in terms of effort but also financially, especially away from the city of
residence, benefits will help expanding the range of search under the existence of liquidity
constraints.
The data analysis uncovers many regularities. Based on an administrative social security
dataset covering all newly unemployed workers in Austria, which contains information on the
current residence, the previous workplace and the subsequent workplace for those re-hired,
we established a set of facts.
A. Commute time is dispersed and leads to a wage-distance trade-off: i) in a
sample of employed workers having entered the unemployment spells, 57.2% of them had
more than 20 minutes of one way commute distance, while 23.7% had more than 40 mn to
the workplace; 22.6% of them used to work in the same city as where they live; ii) there is a
positive correlation in the data between finding a job with a higher wage and finding a job
with a higher distance; iii) almost as many people face a wage increase as a wage decrease
after finding a new job; iv) almost as many workers face a commute distance increase as
people facing a commute distance decrease.
B. Reservation wage strategies vary over time: the hazard rate of getting a
lower paid job increases relative to the hazard rate of getting a better paid jobs, both for
individuals facing an increase in the commute distance and for individuals facing a decline
in the commute distance.
C. Spatial search strategies vary over time too: i) over time, after the initial
peak, people are much less likely to find a job in the same city than to face an increase in
the commute distance. An interpretation is that job seekers initially search more intensely
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in the same city and then prospect relatively more outside the city; those prospecting at
a shorter distance may be liquidity constrained unemployed, who will accept a lower wage
but cannot afford expensive job search; ii) over time, the likelihood to commute longer
distances increases relative to other hazard rates (no distance change or lower distance); an
interpretation is that, for a given wage offer, the reservation distance increases over time for
those not liquidity constrained.
D. Disincentive effects of social transfers (UI, UA and duration of UI) are
quite robust: i) they imply a negative effect on hazard rates and this applies to all sub-
hazard rates (higher and lower wages, higher and lower commute distance); ii) in relative
terms however, they raise the incidence of getting higher paid jobs as compared to the
previous wage; iii) Quantitatively, our calibrated model implies an elasticity of hazard rate
to benefits of -0.12; while explorations of the role of strict liquidity constraints suggest
negligible effects on unemployment.
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A Theory Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof is easy. The reservation wage R(ρ) is defined by
rcW (R(ρ), ρ) = R(ρ)− c(τρ) + s(Uc −W (R(ρ), ρ))
= R(ρ)− c(τρ) + s(Uc − U) = rcU
so that
R(ρ) = τρ+ rcU + s(U − Uc) (8)
and similarly,
rcW (Rc(ρ), ρ) = Rc(ρ)− c(τρ) + s(Uc −W (Rc(ρ), ρ))
= Rc(ρ)− c(τρ) = rcUc
so that
Rc(ρ) = c(τρ) + rcUc (9)
Hence Lemma 1.
A.2 Extended model: two levels of unemployment compensation
This Section contains the equations from the extended model presented in Section 4. As in
Section 2, we use notations Fρ(w) and G(ρ) for the cumulated distributions of wages and
distances separately. The Bellman equations with two levels of unemployment insurance
are, respectively:
rcUc(D) = B − c(Dc) + δcDcB + 2piλc
ˆ Dc
0
(ˆ
w
Max[W (w, ρ)− Uc; 0]dFρ(w)
)
dG(ρ) + α(U − Uc)
(10)
rU(D) = b− c(D) + δDb+ 2piλ
ˆ D
0
(ˆ
w
Max[W (w, ρ)− U ; 0]dFρ(w)
)
dG(ρ) (11)
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The value functions for employment are, under the assumption that the employed work-
ers have the same easy access to credit and saving plans as the covered unemployed:
rcWc(w, ρ) = w − c(τρ) + δc(τρ)w + s(Uc −Wc(w, ρ)) (12)
where c(τρ) is the commute cost for employees. The presence of τ captures the possibility
that search and commuting distance may affect disutility differently. Equation 12 similarly
applies to uncovered workers.
The solutions proceed from the previous analysis, except that ∂Wc
∂w
(w, ρ) = 1
rc+s
(1 + δcτρ);
∂Wc
∂ρ
(w, ρ) = 1
rc+s
(−c′(τρ)τ + δcτw) so that, denoting by Rc(ρ) the reservation wage of an
eligible worker associated with distance ρ, defined as Wc(Rc(ρ), ρ) = Uc(D
∗
c ) = Uc (for sim-
plicity we drop the optimal strategy D∗c ) and by R(ρ) the reservation wage of an uncovered
worker associated with distance ρ, defined as W (R(ρ), ρ) = U(D∗) = U , we can rewrite the
value of employment as a linear function of w:
Wc(w, ρ)− Uc = 1 + δcτρ
rc + s
(w −Rc(ρ)) = Sc(w, ρ) (13)
Similar steps lead to
W (w, ρ)− U = 1 + δτρ
r + s
(w −R(ρ)) = S(w, ρ)
We can now derive the reservation wages:
R(ρ) =
1
1 + δτρ
[c(τρ) + rcU + s(U − Uc)] (14)
Rc(ρ) =
1
1 + δcτρ
[c(τρ) + rcUc] (15)
From 14 and 15 we can compute the derivative of the reservation wage with respect to
distance:
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∂R
∂ρ
=
c′(τρ)
1 + δτρ
− δτ
(1 + δτρ)2
[c(τρ) + rcU + s(U − Uc)] (16)
Equation 16 shows that the reservation wage is a non linear function of commute distance.
This slope should be compared to the slope of the empirical relationship displayed in the
last panel of Figure 5. Our calibration ensures the positivity of the relationship.
A.2.1 Optimal search strategies
The first order condition on the radius can now be derived. Let wmax be the upper support
of the wage distribution. We have
rU(D) = b− C(D) + δDb+ 2piλEw,ρS(w, ρ) (17)
U(D) is maximised when
C ′D(D
∗)− δb = 2piλEwS(w,D∗)g(D∗) (18)
Similarly, Uc(Dc, λc) is maximised when:
C ′D(D
∗
c )− δcB = 2piλcEwS(w,D∗c )g(D∗c ) (19)
Similar expression as in Section 2 hold for the optimal search intensity λ and λc.
A.2.2 Extension of Lemma 3 to two types of unemployed workers
We now have:
rU(D,λ) = b− C(D,λ) + 2piλ
ˆ D
0
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
rcUc(Dc, λc) = B − C(Dc, λc) + 2piλc
ˆ Dc
0
ˆ wmax
Rc(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ) + α(U − Uc)
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The first value equation, through the envelope condition, leads as before to: r dU
db
= 1; the
second value equation leads to
(rc + α)
dUc
dB
= 1 + α
dU
dB
A.2.3 Dynamics of the pool of covered and uncovered job seekers
Let us denote by Nc(t) and Nnc(t) the number of covered and uncovered unemployed workers
at time t for a given cohort entering unemployment at time t = 0. We have, for all t > 0:
dNc/dt = −(hazc + α)Nc
dNnc/dt = −hazNnc + αNc
These first order partial differential equations are easy to solve. In particular, we have that:
Nc(t) = Nc(0)e
−(hazc+α)t (20)
Nnc(t) = Nnc(0)e
−haz.t +
αe−haz.t
hazc + α− hazNc(0)
(
1− e−(hazc+α−haz)t) (21)
where both lines are obtained in fixing the integration constant to get the initial value at
time t = 0 (entrance into the unemployment spell). Further, if all new entrants are covered,
we have that Nnc(0) = 0. The two equations (20) and (21) determine the fractions of
each of the four groups, that is, the covered and uncovered job seekers in the population of
applicants.
A.3 Extended model: directing search towards the previous city
The new first order conditions on optimal search intensity now read as follows:
C ′λ(D,λ, λ
0) = 2pi
[ˆ d0−
0
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
[
1 + δτρ
r + s
(w −R(ρ))
]
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
+
ˆ D
d0−
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
[
1 + δτρ
r + s
(w −R(ρ))
]
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
]
(22)
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C ′λ0(D,λ, λ
0) = 2pi
ˆ d0+
d0−
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
[
1 + δτρ
r + s
(w −R(ρ))
]
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) (23)
A.4 Extended model: hazard rates
There are now six sub-hazard rates sub−haz(w+, d+), sub−haz(w+, d−), sub−haz(w−, d+),
sub − haz(w−, d−), sub − haz(w+, d0), sub − haz(w−, d0), where the sum of these six sub-
hazard rates is the total hazard rate haz. Taking advantage of the empirical evidence, we
assign a peculiar role to the previous workplace, here proxied by the median distance. To
discretize space, we define the area around the previous workplace as a small circle centered
in d0. Let ε be the radius of this small circle, it is useful to define d0− ≡ d0 − ε and
d0+ ≡ d0 + ε. We calibrate ε to be 10% of d0.
Moreover, we allow for the possibility that individuals exert effort in the previous work-
place at a different (possibly higher) rate, denoted by λ0 and λ0c for uncovered and covered
workers, respectively. Notice that, under this assumption, the value of unemployment should
be rewritten:
rU(D) = b− c(D) + δDb+ 2piλ0Eρ|ρ∈[d0− ,d0+ ]S(w, ρ) + 2piλEρ|ρ∈[0,d0− )∪(d0+ ,D]S(w, ρ)
The optimality conditions conversely do not change, provided that we always ensure
D > d0+ and Dc > d0+,c.
We thus define the total hazard rate of covered and uncovered workers as:
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haz = 2piλ
[ˆ d0−
0
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ) +
ˆ D
d0+
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
]
+ 2piλ0
[ˆ d0+
d0−
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
]
=2piλ
[ˆ d0−
0
[1− Fρ(R(ρ))]dG(ρ) +
ˆ D
d0+
[1− Fρ(R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
]
+ 2piλ0
[ˆ d0+
d0−
[1− Fρ(R(ρ))]dG(ρ)
]
hazc = 2piλc
[ˆ d0−
0
ˆ wmax
Rc(ρ)
dFc,ρ(w)dGc(ρ) +
ˆ Dc
d0+
ˆ wmax
Rc(ρ)
dFc,ρ(w)dGc(ρ)
]
+ 2piλ0c
[ˆ d0+
d0−
ˆ wmax
Rc(ρ)
dFc,ρ(w)dGc(ρ)
]
= 2piλc
[ˆ d0−
0
[1− Fc,ρ(Rc(ρ))]dGc(ρ) +
ˆ Dc
d0+
[1− Fc,ρ(Rc(ρ))]dGc(ρ)
]
+ 2piλ0c
[ˆ d0+
d0−
ˆ wmax
Rc(ρ)
dFc,ρ(w)dGc(ρ)
]
A.5 Calibration
The calibration strategy is as follows. First, we fix the parameters for which we have some
information. For instance, we set B (the unemployment insurance) and b (unemployment
benefits) to be 35 % and 3% of the average wage, respectively. Our benchmark calibration
assumes an annual interest rate of 4% for workers covered by unemployment insurance (B),
while long-term unemployed face a higher borrowing rate (rc = 12% annually). We assume
wages and distances are distributed log-normally and we set the mean and the standard
deviation to their empirical counterparts. We can allow for arbitrary values of correlation,
but in the baseline calibration strategy we start with independent distributions. We set the
separation rate so as to match an average unemployment rate around 6%. For the disutility
component of the search cost function we assume separability between distance and search
intensity and convexity in each argument (ηc = ηλ = 1.5). Importantly, we assume that
agents (both covered and uncovered) weight less the effort provided to search in the previous
workplace rather than outside (γλ
0
, γλ
0
c < 1). Moreover, covered workers suffer less from the
intensity of search in the previous workplace than uncovered agents (γλ
0
c < γ
λ0). This is an
important assumption: because we do not introduce other dimensions of heterogeneity, the
asymmetry in the search cost is needed to rationalize the empirical observations that covered
workers exit unemployment more quickly and they are relatively more “city stayers”. The
weight on the cost of search intensity has an alternative interpretation as the efficiency of
the search process. It is rational to make the assumption that covered workers are relatively
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more efficient in searching jobs for several not self-excluding reasons, as discussed in Section
5.1. We set δ = δc = −0.2; this calibration implies that, for any given income (consumption)
level, agents are better off when they search/commute less.
Given that our dataset does not provide any specific information about the private cost
of commuting and the transport infrastructures, we choose a linear commuting cost function
with coefficient (τ) equal to 1. This monetary component also enters the search cost function
with the same coefficient.
For a given set of parameters, the dynamic of the hazard rate, the sub-hazards and their
ratios is driven by the relative share of workers belonging to the covered or uncovered state,
respectively. More precisely, in each period the hazard rate is a weighted average of the
hazard rate of covered and uncovered workers, where the weights are represented by the
share of workers in these two states, respectively. As time goes, the share of uncovered
workers increases, thus triggering the dynamic of the hazard rates. Hence, in the model, the
dynamic is entirely due to the different search strategies chosen by covered and uncovered
workers.
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Table B.1: Effects of Potential Benefit Duration on covered job seekers
PBD (weeks) 0 26 52 99 104
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 61.73 65.15 66.24 67.21 67.27
Average distance (min) 27.51 25.14 23.97 22.53 22.41
Hazard rate 0.2307 0.1004 0.0707 0.0481 0.0466
Rejection rate 0.004 0.013 0.015 0.017 0.017
Share city stayers 0.15 20.54 24.67 28.38 28.67
Unemployment 0.000 0.015 0.025 0.042 0.043
Decisions
Reservation wage 33.55 44.80 48.41 51.83 52.09
Search radius 1.52 1.14 1.01 0.87 0.86
Effort outside d0 0.0297 0.0144 0.0108 0.0079 0.0077
Effort inside d0 0.1042 0.0520 0.0401 0.0307 0.0301
B Supplementary Results: theory
B.1 Policy simulations
Tables from B.1 to B.6 report the changes in the observed outcomes and the decisions of
the unemployed for different policy experiments. Regarding the Potential Benefit Duration,
we consider the absence of UA (0 weeks), 26 weeks like in the US, the double of this
value (52 weeks) and two extreme values (99-104 weeks) which correspond to the maximum
reached during the last recession. For the UI we consider a wide range of values, varying the
replacement rate from 0 to 80%, which is among the maximum values observed in reality
(Denmark). In Austria the current replacement rate is around 40%. UA is expressed in
terms of UI, ranging from 0 to 50%.
The information conveyed by the tables are the same as in Figure 15 and discussed in
Section 5.4.
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Table B.2: Effects of Potential Benefit Duration on uncovered job seekers
PBD (weeks) 0 26 52 99 104
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 60.51 60.34 60.29 60.25 60.24
Average distance (min) 25.70 25.86 25.91 25.95 25.96
Hazard rate 0.0446 0.0469 0.0477 0.0484 0.0484
Rejection rate 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Share city stayers 11.58 4.61 3.46 2.70 2.65
Unemployment 0.082 0.048 0.041 0.035 0.034
Decisions
Reservation wage 34.00 33.19 32.94 32.70 32.68
Search radius 1.21 1.23 1.24 1.25 1.25
Effort outside d0 0.0078 0.0082 0.0083 0.0084 0.0084
Effort inside d0 0.0072 0.0075 0.0076 0.0077 0.0077
Table B.3: Effects of Unemployment Insurance (B) on covered job seekers
Replacement rate 0 0.20 0.4 0.6 0.8
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 65.34 64.97 64.69 64.47 64.31
Average distance (min) 26.35 25.86 25.39 24.92 24.44
Hazard rate 0.1209 0.1162 0.1114 0.1066 0.1016
Rejection rate 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Share city stayers 18.99 18.93 18.86 18.80 18.72
Unemployment 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Decisions
Reservation wage 43.38 43.72 44.06 44.42 44.79
Search radius 1.31 1.23 1.17 1.11 1.06
Effort outside d0 0.0169 0.0163 0.0157 0.0151 0.0145
Effort inside d0 0.0592 0.0579 0.0565 0.0552 0.0538
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Table B.4: Effects of Unemployment Insurance (B) on uncovered job seekers
Replacement rate 0 0.20 0.4 0.6 0.8
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 60.37 60.37 60.36 60.36 60.35
Average distance (min) 25.83 25.84 25.84 25.85 25.85
Hazard rate 0.0466 0.0466 0.0467 0.0468 0.0468
Rejection rate 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Share city stayers 4.93 5.03 5.15 5.27 5.40
Unemployment 0.050 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.053
Decisions
Reservation wage 33.47 33.45 33.42 33.40 33.37
Search radius 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23
Effort outside d0 0.0081 0.0081 0.0081 0.0082 0.0082
Effort inside d0 0.0074 0.0074 0.0074 0.0075 0.0075
Table B.5: Effects of Unemployment Assistance (b) on covered job seekers
Percentage of B 0 0.25 0.5
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 64.69 64.88 65.09
Average distance (min) 25.55 25.41 25.23
Hazard rate 0.1145 0.1089 0.1028
Rejection rate 0.012 0.012 0.013
Share city stayers 18.81 19.03 19.30
Unemployment 0.012 0.012 0.012
Decisions
Reservation wage 43.46 44.04 44.70
Search radius 1.19 1.17 1.15
Effort outside d0 0.0161 0.0154 0.0147
Effort inside d0 0.0576 0.0554 0.0529
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Table B.6: Effects of Unemployment Assistance (b) on uncovered job seekers
Percentage of B 0 0.25 0.5
Observed outcomes
Average wage (euros per day) 60.31 60.47 60.66
Average distance (min) 26.00 25.52 24.97
Hazard rate 0.0481 0.0439 0.0395
Rejection rate 0.003 0.003 0.004
Share city stayers 5.10 5.16 5.21
Unemployment 0.050 0.055 0.062
Decisions
Reservation wage 32.53 33.76 35.12
Search radius 1.25 1.19 1.12
Effort outside d0 0.0083 0.0077 0.0070
Effort inside d0 0.0076 0.0071 0.0066
B.2 The strict liquidity constraints case
In the case the unemployed have decumulated their assets and face a subsistance level for
consumption, say C, they face the following strong cash constraint that prevents them from
searching optimally in space:
b ≥ C +M(D)
Lemma 5 (strict liquidity constraints). In the absence of assets and under separability
of the cost function, e.g. C(D,λ) = M(D) + e(λ,D) where the first part is monetary, the
constrained range of search is sub-optimal if
D¯(b) = M−1(b− C) < D∗
The constrained value is increasing in the level of benefits and decreasing in the subsistence
level. In turn, the optimal effort λ∗ will itself react to the constrained value D¯(b).
This Lemma introduces a new role of unemployment insurance in the presence of imper-
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fect financial markets as studied in Baily (1978), Chetty (2008) or Werning (2002) or Shimer
and Werning (2003). It recognizes that search costs are not only time costs or disutility
costs, but have a monetary component due to the existence of the spatial dispersion of jobs.
The equivalent results of Lemma 3 in the strict liquidity constraints case can be summarized
as follows:
Lemma 6 (unemployment benefits impact). Under strict liquidity constraints as in
Lemma 5, the impact of benefits on U is larger than the inverse of the discount rate.
The proof of this Lemma and 3 in the text is based on the derivatives of
rU(D,λ) = b− C(D,λ) + 2piλ
ˆ D
0
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
S(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
with respect to b for the ongoing rate of interest. Denote by D˜ the minimum between the
optimal search radius D∗ and the constrained level D¯(b): we have
r
dU
db
= 1
+
∂λ∗
∂b
[−C ′λ + 2piEw,ρS(w, ρ)]
+
∂D˜
∂b
[
−C ′D(D˜, λ) + 2piλEwS(w, D˜)
]
+ 2piλ
ˆ D
0
∂R(ρ)
∂b
[−S(R(ρ), ρ)f(ρ)] dG(ρ)
The last line is by definition equal to zero since the surplus is equal to zero at R(ρ). In
interior solutions, by the envelope theorem, the second and third lines are equal to zero as
well. Hence, the effect of benefits is equivalent to a permanent rise in the income of the
unemployed workers, who will enjoy both higher benefits as unemployed and choose higher
wages in the future. The situation is different for credit constrained unemployed workers;
indeed, if D = D¯(b) < D∗ is the constrained level of the range of search, then the envelope
condition of the third line does not hold. In this case, −C ′D + 2piλEwS(w,D∗) > 0; then,
the effect of benefits on the value of unemployment is larger than 1/r.
Figures B.1 and B.2 compare the dynamics of the simulated hazard rates and of the
search strategies with and without liquidity constraints.
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Starred lines in Figures B.3 and B.4 represent policy simulations under a calibration
that implies strict liquidity constraints for uncovered workers (D = ¯D(b)) . Covered workers
turn out not to be constrained because the unemployment insurance they are entitled to
is substantially higher than assistance. The results are especially interesting for policy
changes affecting unemployment assistance (b). For low values of b, uncovered agents are
liquidity constrained: this implies a sub-optimally low search radius and hazard rate. Notice
that the presence of liquidity constraints affects search strategies also at early stages of
the unemployment spell, since agents take into account the possibility of switching to the
uncovered state.
Table B.7 summarizes these results in terms of elasticities.
Figure B.3: Policy effects on hazard rates: strict liquidity constraints for the unemployed
under the UA regime
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Notes: solid lines refer to the regime with mild liquidity constraints (r > rc); dotted lines show results when unemployed
agents under UA are subject to strict liquidity constraints.
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Figure B.1: Simulated hazard rates: strict liquidity constraints for the unemployed under
the UA regime
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Figure B.2: Search strategies: strict liquidity constraints for the unemployed under the UA
regime
0 5 10 15
30
35
40
t
Reservation wage (R)
Benchmark
Liquidity constraints
0 5 10 15
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
t
Search radius (D)
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
·10−2
t
Search effort
λ0
λ
Table B.7: Elasticities of the model with strict liquidity constraints (for the workers under
the UA regime)
Covered job seekers Uncovered job seekers
B b PBD B b PBD
Observed outcomes
Average wage -0.00701 0.00934 0.02091 -0.00018 0.05378 -0.00115
Average distance -0.03702 -0.00802 -0.05842 0.00000 0.46273 0.00000
Hazard rate -0.08625 -0.11424 -0.40725 0.00277 0.53952 0.01776
Rejection rate 0.02079 0.10929 0.24895 -0.01042 1.56581 -0.06749
Share city stayers -0.00558 -0.19833 0.23877 0.04798 -0.37945 -0.35029
Unemployment 0.02930 0.06746 0.75717 0.02651 -0.41595 -0.20347
Decisions
Reservation wage 0.01597 0.03255 0.09952 -0.00160 0.09303 -0.01034
Search radius -0.10181 -0.02287 -0.15013 0.00000 1.29386 0.00000
Effort outside d0 -0.07337 -0.09554 -0.33739 0.00262 0.31476 0.01683
Effort inside d0 -0.04732 -0.09486 -0.31042 0.00277 -0.15647 0.01779
Notes: The elasticity of y with respect to x is defined as
(
∆y
y
)
/
(
∆x
x
)
. Elasticities are computed from simulations, considering
the following policy changes: ∆B from 40 to 50 % of the previous wage; ∆b from 8% to 10% of the benchmark B; ∆ PBD 30
to 39 weeks.
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Figure B.4: Policy effects on search strategies: strict liquidity constraints for the unemployed
under the UA regime
20 30 40
30
35
40
45
B
R
e
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
w
a
g
e
Benefits (B)
2 2.5
30
35
40
b
Assistance (b)
10 20 30 40
30
35
40
45
PBD
Pot. Benefit Dur. (1/α)
R
Rc
20 30 40
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
B
S
e
a
rc
h
ra
d
iu
s
2 2.5
0.9
1
1.1
1.2
b
10 20 30 40
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
PBD
D
Dc
20 30 40
1
1.5
2
·10−2
B
E
ff
o
rt
o
u
ts
id
e
sa
m
e
c
it
y
2 2.5
1
1.5
2
·10−2
b
10 20 30 40
1
1.5
2
·10−2
PBD
λ
λc
20 30 40
2
4
·10−2
B
E
ff
o
rt
sa
m
e
c
it
y
2 2.5
2
4
·10−2
b
10 20 30 40
0
2
4
6
8
·10−2
PBD
λ0
λ0c
Notes: solid lines refer to the regime with mild liquidity constraints (r > rc); dotted lines show results when unemployed
agents under UA are subject to strict liquidity constraints.
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B.3 Maximizing the social welfare function with benefits
The social welfare function is the sum of the value of unemployment and the social value
of employment, possibly incorporating the social costs of commutes, to which unemploy-
ment insurance and assistance must be deducted. Some intermediate results will be useful.
Denote by uc and unc the number of unemployed workers who are covererd and non cov-
ered, respectively; we have the differente rates of unemployment by equality of inflows and
outflows:
s(1− uc − unc) = uc.(hazardc + α)
ucα = unc.hazardnc
uc =
s
α + s+ hazardc + αs/hazardnc
;
unc =
s
α + s+ hazardc + αs/hazardnc
α
hazardnc
u = uc + unc
There are two special cases: when α = 0 we obtain u = s/(s + hazardc); and when
hazardc = hazardnc, we also have u = s/(s+ hazardc).
Introducing the notations:
rU˜(D,λ) = 0× b− C(D,λ) + 2piλ
ˆ D
0
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
S˜(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ)
rcU˜c(Dc, λc) = 0×B − C(Dc, λc) + 2piλ
ˆ D
0
ˆ wmax
R(ρ)
S˜(w, ρ)dFρ(w)dG(ρ) + α(U˜ − U˜c)
the social welfare function is therefore
Ω = uncU˜(D,λ) + ucU˜(Dc, λc) + (1− uc − unc)Ew,ρ [W (w, ρ)− SC(ρ)] .
where SC(ρ) represent the social costs of commuting15. We vary B and b under two polar
15For the social costs of commuting we utilize the following specification: SC(ρ)=
τsocial
[
haz·unc
s Enc(ρ) +
hazc·uc
s Ec(ρ)
]
.
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Figure B.5: Policy effects on social welfare
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cases: one where agents under unemployment assistance (b) are only mildly constrained;
one where agents under unemployment insurance B are not liquidity constrained but agents
under unemployment assistance b cannot afford to pay for long search distances. The effects
of policy changes on social welfare are plotted in Figure B.5 , where the solid line represents
the behavior of the social welfare function under mild financial constraints and the starred
line refers to the case where the uncovered workers are liquidity constrained for low values
of assistance. It can be seen that the socially optimal level of unemployment insurance is
zero, since welfare declines monotonically with B. Instead, if under mild liquidity constraint
the same is true fom b (unemployment assistance), in the more realistic case of liquidity
contraints for households in the assistance regime, there is an optimal level of unemployment
assistance and social welfare, which first goes up as the range of search can be extended and
the constraints are reduced. Once the cash constraint is suppressed however, higher levels
of assistance reduce search intensity and welfare goes down again.
The gap between the dotted line and the solid line in Figure B.6 represents the per-
centage points of unemployment that can be attributed to the existence of strict liquidity
constraints, the fact that the unemployed cannot search over the optimal range. This gap
is 0.3 percentage points in the left panel, but the gap depends very much on the value of
b which determines the value of D in the case of strict liquidity constraints; in the middle
panel, the difference is as high as 0.072-0.064, that is 0.8 percentage points of unemployment.
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Figure B.6: Policy effects on the unemployment rate: strict liquidity constraints for the
unemployed under the UA regime
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Notes: solid lines refer to the regime with mild liquidity constraints (r > rc); dotted lines show results when unemployed
agents under UA are subject to strict liquidity constraints.
C Supplementary results: empirics
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Figure C.1: Average Commuting Time by Workplace (left) and Residency (right) around
Vienna from the empirical data analysis
Table C.2 reports the estimates of the effects of the policy parameters when the wage and
the distance dimensions are considered jointly. We start by looking into how UI affects the
rate of finding a better paying job, closer to home (w+ /d−). This transition should not be
affected by changes in the reservation wage or search radius, just by search intensity, thus
representing a convenient baseline. Indeed, point estimates on UI parameters are small in
absolute value. Compared to this baseline, UI significantly reduces exits to worse paid jobs,
regardless of whether the job is closer or farther from home (w−/d+, w−/d−). Compared
to the baseline, neither UI benefits nor assistance affect exists to better paid jobs located
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Figure C.2: Kinks in the UI benefit schedule and discontinuity in age
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further away from home (w + /d+). The key effect on distance is via potential benefit
duration which reduces the transitions to jobs located further from home but has no effect
on the baseline. Results for job seekers who make transitions into jobs that are different
from the previous one suggest reservation wages adjust but search radius does not.
The remaining bivariate transition rates feature either a wage that stays the same (w0)
or a distance that stays the same (d0). Results from outcomes where distance stays the
same (columns 7 to 9) indicate a strong effect of UI benefits and assistance on transitions to
worse paid, w−/d0, (or equally paid, w0/d0) jobs, compared to the transition to better paid
jobs (w + /d0). The outcomes where wages stay the same (columns 3, 6 and 9 again) show
somewhat more reduced transitions to the same city (w0/d0) as unemployment benefits or
assistance increase, compared to being either further (w0/d+) or closer to home (w0/d−).
Results on bivariate estimates are generally consistent with the univariate results.
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D Appendix: Robustness checks of Cox-Estimates and
some light evidence of strong credit constraints
Table D.1 investigates the robustness of the estimates to the exclusion of largest cities.
Differences are marginal.
Table D.3 is an attempt to decompose the results of the effects of benefits and assistance
on different outcomes for individuals likely to be credit-constrained (people with at least 3
years of tenure on the job before UI (getting 2 months of salary as cash-on-hand) and those not.
Interestingly, coefficients of the effect of benefits B of larger distance in the left of the table
are larger for credit constrained agents, suggesting the existence of such effects.
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Table D.3: Cox-Model Estimates, sub-hazards by previous tenure
Benefits Assistance
d+ d0 d− d+ d0 d−
Constraint
w+ 1.680??? 1.366??? 1.065??? 0.001 0.066 -0.523
w0 0.669
??? 0 -0.008 0.382 0 -0.603
w− -0.250 -0.019 -0.695??? 0.504 0.735 0.321
Unconstraint
w+ 1.468??? 1.150??? 1.498??? 0.649?? 0.634?? 0.737??
w0 0.458
??? 0 0.380?? 0.538? 0 0.439
w− -0.675??? -0.587??? -0.704??? 0.127 0.310 0.235
Notes: The table summarizes estimates from a competing risk Cox regression to each combination
of wage and distance destination. The table reports coefficients on unemployment benefits (B)
and unemployment assistance (b) relative to the coefficient estimated for the constant wage and
same municipality of residence destination (w0,d0). Significance is indicated as follows: *(p<0.1),
**(p<0.05), *** (p<0.01). Unconstraint : people with at least 3 years of tenure on the job before
UI (getting 2 months of salary as cash-on-hand). Constraint : other.
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